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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 32Abstract
This paper examines how price setting plays a key role in explaining the steady-state eﬀects of
inﬂation in a monopolistic competition economy. Three pricing variants (optimal prices, indexed
prices, and unchanged prices) are introduced through a generalization of the Calvo-type setting
that allows the possibility of price indexation, i.e., prices may be adjusted by the rate of inﬂation.
We found that in an economy with less indexed prices the steady-state negative impact of inﬂation
on output is higher. In the extreme case without no price indexation at all (purely Calvo-type
economy), unrealistically heavy falls in capital and output were reported when steady-state inﬂa-
tion increases. Regarding welfare analysis, our results support a long-run monetary policy aimed
at price stability with a close-to-zero inﬂation target. This ﬁnding is robust to any price setting
scenario.
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JEL classification: E13, E31, E50.Non-technical summary
This working paper studies the implications of having diﬀerent price setting behavior in a
monopolistic competition economy. Three ways of deciding prices are introduced: optimal prices
(when the price is set by solving an optimizing problem), indexed prices (when the price is au-
tomatically increased by the rate of inﬂation), and unchanged prices (when the price remains
constant for the coming period). We will considered a constant fraction of producers using each
of these three alternatives for price setting. Then, our objective will be to analyze the eﬀects in
the long-run of having higher inﬂation in the economy. Our results show that there is a negative
long-run relationship between inﬂation and output for any pricing distribution. Moreover, the
impact of higher inﬂation on output is larger when a higher fraction of prices remain unchanged.
ECB • Working Paper No 140 • May 2002 51 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of diﬀerent pricing speciﬁcations in the steady-
state analysis of inﬂation. Our framework will be a closed-economy optimizing monetary model
with monopolistic competition. The steady-state solution will be computed and will then be
altered by its rate of inﬂation under several price setting variants.
Following early contributions by Hicks (1935), Baumol (1952) and Sidrauski (1967), most
optimizing monetary models coincide in featuring a money demand based upon the role of money
as a medium of exchange.1 Money is employed by economic agents as a means of facilitating daily
transactions. More explicitly, a transaction costs function can be incorporated into the model
with real money balances as one of its arguments. Here we will follow this argument by including
a shopping time technology as in McCallum and Goodfriend (1987).
In this paper, producers will decide prices in a standard monopolistic competition setup. Price
rigidities arise when market circumstances prevent producers from choosing their optimal price.
Speciﬁcally, we begin by taking the pricing scheme described in the seminal paper by Calvo
(1983), now widespread in the literature, i.e., producers can set a new price optimally only under
some ﬁxed probability. This setting has been recently criticized by Wolman (1999) because the
probability of optimal price adjustment should not be independent of the number of periods
without adjustment. Besides, a substantial fraction of producers stay for a considerable number
of periods without making price changes.2
Taking this criticism into consideration, we introduce two alternatives among producers who
cannot price optimally. They will either maintain the price unchanged (as in the original Calvo
setup), or adjust the price by raising it by the long-run rate of inﬂation (the price indexation
scheme). The choice between indexing the price or keep it unchanged is exogenously determined
by a ﬁxed probability. As a result, there are three types of prices in the economy: optimal, indexed,
and unchanged. The distribution of producers according to their price setting behavior will be
deﬁned when calibrating the probabilities on both price stickiness and price indexation.
The rationale for price indexation is based on the presence of high evaluation costs to determine
the optimal price (information costs, processing costs, computational costs,...).3 If these costs are
1There are two approaches to demand analysis that recognize only the store-of-value role of money, namely, the
portfolio approach of Tobin (1958) and the overlapping generations approach of Wallace (1980). Since these ignore
the medium-of-exchange function, they imply that no money would be demanded if there were other assets (of equal
riskiness) yielding positive interest earnings to their holders.
2In addition, there are a number of papers that emphasize the diﬃculties of replicating some of the business cycle
features of modern economies by using a New-Keynesian Phillips curve based on the Calvo price setting speciﬁcation.
Two representative works are Fuhrer and Moore (1995), and Mankiw (2001).
3Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) have already put forth this argument in their model and cite a paper
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implied by the price indexation rule turns out to be the optimal one on a steady-state basis and
therefore the average losses that it will entail would not appear excessive.
As for the decision to maintain the price unchanged, it may come about because of the existence
of menu costs.4 Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) ﬁnd in a state-dependent model with ﬁxed costs
to changing prices that more producers will adjust prices when the rate of inﬂation rises. Without
endogenizing pricing behavior in this paper, we will calculate the welfare losses associated with
maintaining prices in a more inﬂationary economy. This might be compared with some measure
of menu costs in order to decide whether or not to use price indexation, and thus endogenize the
price indexation behavior.
The study of the long-term eﬀects of inﬂation and its welfare cost in optimizing monetary
models has received much attention in the last few years (recent contributions include Dotsey and
Ireland (1996), Wolman (1997), Chadha, Haldane and Janssen (1998), Wu and Zhang (2000), and
Lucas (2000)). Most of the papers give welfare cost of inﬂation ﬁgures relative to the Friedman rule
rate (Friedman (1969)), as they claim that Friedman’s result is applicable in optimizing monetary
models. However when price rigidities are considered in a monopolistic competition-type model,
the Friedman rule rate may not imply maximum welfare on a steady state basis. This point has
been investigated by King and Wolman (1996, 1999), and by Khan, King, and Wolman (2000)
a n dw i l la l s or e c e i v es o m ea t t e n t i o ni nt h i sp a p e r .
As for the organization of the rest of the paper, section 2 describes the model. Section 3
is devoted to determining the transmission mechanisms from nominal to real variables in steady
state. Next, calibration is carried out in section 4. Section 5 deals with the implications of several
price setting scenarios in the steady-state analysis of inﬂation. Section 6 concludes the paper by
stressing the main results obtained.
2 An optimizing model with sticky prices and price indexation
Let the economy contain a continuum of alike households indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. The preferences of
t h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ei n ﬁnitely-lived household, at a moment of time t, are expressed in an intertem-




βjU (ct+j,l t+j) (1)
by Zbaracki et al. (2000) to provide some empirical evidence supporting it.
4Menu costs should be deﬁned in a very broad sense so as to include the direct costs of re-labelling together with
all the indirect costs associated to new prices (information costs, consumers dislike, adjustment costs,...).
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1+ρ,w i t hρ > 0 representing the rate of time preference. The
rational expectation operator in period t is denoted by Et[.] and it proceeds by taking into con-
sideration all the information available for that period. We assume positive ﬁrst derivatives and
negative second derivatives of the instantaneous utility function with respect to both consumption
and leisure (Uc > 0, Ul > 0, Ucc < 0,a n dUll < 0). In addition, we assume no cross marginal
eﬀects (Ucl =0 ).
Consumption units are an aggregate of many goods. Indices were chosen for both consumption














,w i t hθ > 1. (2)
Households are also producers. In period t, the household production function f(nd
t,k t) gives
the amount produced, yt, depending on the stock of capital, kt, undertaken from the previous
production, and on the quantity of labor demanded, nd
t. In particular, a Cobb-Douglas technology







with 0 < α < 1. This technology shows decreasing marginal returns on both labor (fnn < 0)a n d
capital (fkk < 0), positive cross-marginal productivity (fnk > 0), and exhibits constant returns to









in which the amount of output depends negatively on the selling price Pt, and positively on
the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price level PA








Trading needs arise from the separability between what is produced (single good) and what
is consumed (multiple goods) by the household. In this scenario, households can take advantage
of monetary services when carrying out transactions as they may save some transaction costs.
They have at their disposal a time-cost transactions technology that captures the transaction
5We are implicitly assuming that any household could also produce the aggregate output good by using the
Dixit-Stiglitz output aggregator technology deﬁned in the text. If so, the maximizing proﬁts criterion leads to the
demand equation (4), and the zero-proﬁt condition leads to the Dixit-Stiglitz price level deﬁnition introduced in (2).
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st = s(ct,m t), (5)
where st is the time devoted to shopping (so-called ”shopping time”) in period t.T h e ﬁrst and
second order derivatives have the signs sc > 0,s m < 0,s cc > 0,s mm > 0, and scm < 0.T h e
transactions-facilitating property of money as a medium of exchange is represented through the
signs sm < 0 and scm < 0, which imply that the use of more monetary services reduces the total
and marginal transactions costs.
Thus, in period t households will split their total time T between work, leisure, and shopping
T = ns
t + lt + st, (6)
where ns
t is the labor supply in period t. The budget constraint to be held in period t by the




yt + gt = ct + kt − (1 − δ)kt−1 + wt(nd
t − ns
t)+mt − (1 + πt)−1mt−1 +( 1+rt)−1bt − bt−1,
(7)
where gt are government lump-sum transfers, δ is the capital depreciation rate, wt is the real wage,
πt i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation, and rt is the real interest rate.




yt, and net lump-sum real transfers from the government gt. Income is spent on consumption
goods ct, on investment kt−(1−δ)kt−1, on payments for net labor hired wt(nd
t −ns
t),o ni n c r e a s i n g
the demand for real money holdings mt − (1 + πt)−1mt−1, and on net purchases of government
bonds (1 + rt)−1bt − bt−1. The following deﬁnitions were used for real money balances, inﬂation,






















6Alternatively, there could exist an output-cost transactions technology in which transaction costs would be
measured in terms of output and would enter the budget constraint (see Casares (2000) for a survey on optimizing
monetary models).
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by applying a constant rule on money growth and lump-sum real transfers respectively
µt = µ, (12)
gt = g. (13)
The lump-sum transfers of the government are ﬁnanced either by increasing the money supply
or by selling bonds to the households. In turn, the government budget constraint becomes in
aggregate output terms
gt = mt − (1 + πt)−1mt−1 +( 1+rt)−1bt − bt−1. (14)
The optimal choices of the representative household in period t are those that solve the opti-
mizing dynamic problem which involves deciding ct,k t,n d
t,n s
t,l t,m t,b t, and Pt so as to maximize
(1) while satisfying the sequence of current and expected future budget, time, and Dixit-Stiglitz
demand constraints.7
The selling price Pt is subject to the market conditions àl aCalvo, i.e., each producer can set
the optimal price only with a probability equal to 1−η. Those producers who cannot optimize the
selling price will have two alternatives. First, under a constant probability equal to χ, they will
i n c r e a s et h ep r i c eb yt h el o n g - r u nr a t eo fi n ﬂation. Thus, a fraction ηχ of producers will adjust
their price following the indexation rule Pt =( 1+π)Pt−1 with π denoting the steady-state rate of
inﬂation. Second, they will leave the price unchanged with a probability 1 − χ. In other words,
the fraction η(1 − χ) of the households will set Pt = Pt−1.8
The price indexation rule Pt =( 1+π)Pt−1 was chosen because it is consistent with the optimal
dynamic pricing decision in a time-evolving steady state. The reason behind this is that in steady
state both optimal and indexed prices grow at the steady-state rate of inﬂation, π.9
Aggregate variables and the overall resources constraint.
7The behavioral equations of this households-as-producers model are equivalent to those obtained when ﬁrms
were considered as separate entities producing and selling their diﬀerentiated good in a monopolistic competition
market. They would hire labor and rent capital from the households in competitive markets. The maximizing-proﬁt
criterion would lead to the same ﬁrst order conditions for the selling price, the demand for labor, and the demand
for capital.
8Examples of models using such a non-optimal pricing scheme are Yun (1996), and Erceg et al. (2000). For the
steady state purposes of this paper, the price adjustment rule selected would be equivalent to Pt =( 1+πt−1)Pt−1
which has been used in Christiano et al. (2001).
9See equation (A2) in the appendix for details regarding this result.
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the selling price, output, and the demands for labor and capital.
Let yt(j) denote the average output produced in aggregate output units by the households
who last changed their price optimally j periods ago. In addition, let nd
t(j) and kt(j) denote their
average quantities of labor and capital demanded. These average ﬁgures need to be calculated
when taking into consideration the various price adjustment schemes that may be applied from
period t − j to period t.
Substituting the government budget constraint (14) in the household budget constraint, and




(1 − η)ηjyt(j) = ct +
∞
j=0







We assume perfect competition in the labor market. Therefore, the real wage is the market-
clearing wage. Since labor supply is identical among households there will be equilibrium in







Taking both (15) and (16) into consideration, the overall resources constraint is
yt = ct + kt − (1 − δ)kt−1, (17)
where yt =
∞
j=0 (1 − η)ηjyt(j) and kt−(1−δ)kt−1 =
∞
j=0 (1 − η)ηj kt(j) − (1 − δ)kt−1(j) .
Finally, we intend to express yt in steady state in terms of both average labor and capital
entering the production function. As shown in the appendix, there is a steady-state relationship









, and variables without time sub-
scripts denote steady-state ﬁgures. The link factor φ depends on the steady state rate of inﬂation
π, the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity θ, and the price stickiness parameters η and χ.10 Hence, the steady-
state overall resources constraint can be formulated as follows
φf(n,k)=c + δk. (17’)
10Note that the value of φ is equal to 1.0, and therefore y = f(n,k), when either η =0 .0 (fully ﬂexible prices),
χ =1 .0 (full price indexation), or when π =0 .0 (constant prices in steady state).
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Here we will take a look at the aggregate magnitudes. All the variables are identical amongThe steady state solution of the model is computed by solving the system consisting of the
household ﬁrst order equations in steady state, and the equations describing the economy presented
above. A reduced system of twelve equations is written at the end of the appendix.
3 Non-superneutrality channels
This section is intended to provide a theoretical explanation of the process that originates long-
run changes in real variables when there is a change in the monetary conditions. In this model
w i t h o u te c o n o m i cg r o w t h ,t h es t e a d y - s t a t en o m i n a lm o n e yg r o w t hr a t eµ determines the steady-
state rate of inﬂation π because the real money balances m = M
PA are constant in steady state.
In turn, growth rates for nominal money and prices must be equal, yielding µ = π. Thus, we will
indistinctly refer to the long-run eﬀects of either inﬂation or money growth.
In this type of monopolistic competition model featuring sticky prices, there are two transmis-
sion channels from inﬂation to the real variables in steady state: the monetary services channel
and the ”capital tax” channel. Let us study them separately.
i) Monetary services channel (the Friedman channel).
Ar i s ei ns t e a d y - s t a t ei n ﬂation, π, will increase on a unit per unit basis the steady-state
nominal interest rate, R. This is due to the fact that in steady state the real interest rate r
is equal to the household rate of time preference, ρ, and therefore it does not vary with a new
steady-state rate of inﬂation. As a result we have r = ρ and the steady-state nominal interest rate
is R = r + π(1 + r)=ρ + π(1 + ρ) ∼ = ρ + π.
If inﬂation and the nominal interest rate go up, the money demand behavior of the households
will lead to less real money balances m held.11 Moreover, the transactions-facilitating role of money
gives rise to a negative ﬁrst derivative sm < 0 in the shopping time function. In accordance, less
real money balances resulting from a more inﬂationary scenario will bring about more shopping
time, s, spent on carrying out transactions. Therefore, if the only eﬀect of high inﬂation were rising
s, labor supply would shrink through the time constraint and we would ﬁnd less labor entering
the production function.12
11In the time-cost transactions technology model at hand, the money demand equation derived from the ﬁrst
order conditions says that real money balances depend positively upon the current level of consumption and the real
wage, and negatively upon the nominal interest rate (see the appendix for the explicit money demand expression).
12Note that less real money balances also drive up marginal transaction costs (as assumed scm < 0). In turn,
consumption becomes more costly and households also shift part of their labor supply to leisure. Nonetheless, this
eﬀect seems to be quantitatively fairly negligible.
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fall in labor will reduce marginal productivity of capital. In turn, the amount of capital demanded
will also fall. With both labor and capital falling, output will also fall. Superneutrality does not
hold and there is a negative long-run relationship between output and inﬂation.
We could refer to this channel as the Friedman rule channel because it implies an optimal rate of
inﬂation that drives nominal interest rates down to 0%, as pointed out by Friedman (1969). If the
nominal interest rate is at 0% the opportunity cost of holding money is null and the amount of real
money balances held is maximum. On the contrary, any positive nominal interest rate gives rise to
some loss of monetary services that will bring about more transaction costs. Then, some resources
will be withdrawn from the productive processes to be used in carrying out transactions. As a
result, there will be a negative impact on output that will originate some welfare cost of inﬂation.
The Friedman rule says that prices must be decreasing at a deﬂation rate π∗ approximately equal
to the real interest rate: π∗ = −r/(1 + r). That will yield the optimal 0% nominal interest rate
which guarantees maximum monetary services held at the exchanges.
ii) The ”capital tax” channel in monopolistic competition with sticky prices.
Capital-labor allocation is optimal when the ratio of marginal productivity to its factor price





(ρ + δ)/(1 + ρ)
, (18)





The real mark-up is the inverse of the real marginal cost.13 Let us relate ψ to the steady state
capital k. The Cobb-Douglas technology inserted on the right hand side of (18) determines that






where it can be appreciated that a higher ψ leads to a lower k. This creates a distortion that
shapes capital accumulation and leads to the well-known eﬃciency loss with respect to perfect
competition. In perfect competition models, ψ is always equal to 1. However, if the economy is in
monopolistic competition, the mark-up is greater than one (ψ > 1). For this reason, it is said that
the presence of monopolistic competition gives rise to a tax on capital accumulation interpreted
as the higher opportunity cost in terms of current production return.
13Taking into account the Cobb-Douglas production technology at hand the real marginal cost can also be ex-














1 − βη (1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ
1 − βη[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ + χ]
1 − η
1 − η[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ]
1/(1−θ)
(20)
that is fully determined by the steady state rate of inﬂation π, and the parameters β, θ, η,a n dχ.
Consequently, there is a steady-state link between π and ψ.
Considering (19) and (20), we can see that the way ψ responds to changes in π will be crucial
in determining the steady-state eﬀects of inﬂation on capital. Moreover, a brief inspection of
(20) already tells us that the price setting conditions will play a signiﬁcant role in explaining this
impact through the parameters η and χ. We will calculate the eﬀects of changes in steady-state
inﬂation under several price setting variants in section 5. Before proceeding in that direction, we
need to calibrate the remaining parameters of the model.
4C a l i b r a t i o n
The model is meant to give quarterly observations. In the baseline calibration both nominal money
and prices grow 1% per quarter in steady state (µ = π =0 .01),4 %p e ry e a r . T h er a t eo ft i m e
preference is set at 0.5% per quarter (ρ =0 .005), 2% per year, which implies β =0 .995.T h e
steady-state nominal interest rate is 1.5% per quarter (R =0 .015), 6% per year obtained as the
sum of the real interest rate and the rate of inﬂation.











with σ,γ,Υ > 0.
The consumption risk aversion coeﬃcient σ is set at σ =4so as to imply an elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution of consumption equal to 0.25. As for the leisure risk aversion coeﬃcient, we took
γ =8which led to a rather low labor supply elasticity to the real wage (+0.25) consistent with
the microeconomic empirical evidence reported by Pencavel (1986). The leisure scale parameter
in the utility function Υ is set to imply that one third of the total time is spent working in the
baseline calibration.
The existing transactions technology is described by a functional form very similar to that
described in Den Haan (1990)
s(ct,m t)=





+ a3mt,i f c t > 0
,
ECB • Working Paper No 140 • May 2002 14with a0,a 1,a 3 ≥ 0,a n d0 ≤ a2 ≤ 1. The constant term a0 was calibrated by considering shopping
time, s, to be 2% of the total time in steady state. The value a1 implies a baseline steady-state
ratio m/c equal to 1.5 as roughly observed in modern economies, whereas a2 =0 .75 implies a -0.25
nominal interest rate elasticity in the money demand function.
The speciﬁcation selected for the transactions technology implies the existence of a satiation
point in real money balances, due to the presence of linear storage costs expressed as a3mt. Then,
if the nominal interest rate were zero (Friedman rule), households would not demand inﬁnite real
money balances. We decided to calibrate the storage cost coeﬃcient, a3,i no r d e rt oi m p l yt h a t
monetary services satiation occurs when the amount of real money balances held is equal to 3
times the quarterly consumption level in steady state (that is, precisely, twice what is held in the
baseline steady-state solution).
In the Cobb-Douglas production technology the capital share parameter is α =0 .36.T h e
depreciation rate for capital δ will be 2.5% per quarter (δ =0 .025). In addition, we set the Dixit-
Stiglitz parameter at θ =1 0 , implying that the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated
goods is equal to 10 and the steady-state mark-up of prices over marginal costs, when prices are
fully ﬂexible, is 11.1%.
As for the price setting calibration, there will be several variants analyzed in the next section
ranging from the fully ﬂexible price case to the sticky price case with no price adjustment. We
will now focus on the implications of these diﬀerent price setting speciﬁcations.
5 The steady-state analysis of inﬂation under several price setting
variants
The alternatives initially proposed are four:
i) Fully ﬂexible prices (η =0 .0). All the selling prices can be adjusted optimally at each period.
ii) Sticky prices (0.0 < η < 1.0) with full price indexation (χ =1 .0). There is a fraction η of
households who cannot set the price optimally at each period. All of them will adjust the price
by applying the rule Pt =( 1+π)Pt−1.
iii) Sticky prices (0.0 < η < 1.0) with partial price indexation (0.0 < χ < 1.0). There is
af r a c t i o nη of households who cannot set the price optimally at each period. Some of them, a
fraction ηχ, will adjust the price by applying the rule Pt =( 1+π)Pt−1. The remaining households,
the fraction η(1 − χ), will maintain the price unchanged Pt = Pt−1.
iv) Sticky prices (0.0 < η < 1.0) with no price adjustment (χ =0 .0). There is a fraction η
of households who cannot set the price optimally at each period. All of them will keep the price
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unchanged Pt = Pt−1.Regarding the long-run analysis at hand, the four price setting cases presented correspond
to only three diﬀerent models because cases i) and ii) have the same steady-state properties. If
all the non-optimal prices are fully indexed, all the prices of the economy will be growing at the
steady-state rate of inﬂation. In turn, the two economies behave identically on a steady-state basis
(see the appendix for details). Hence, we refer indistinctly to both cases i) and ii) as Model 1.
The sticky-price economy with partial price indexation will be Model 2, whereas the sticky-price
economy with no price indexation (the original assumption in Calvo (1983)) will be Model 3.
For the sake of consistency, the parameters Υ, a0,a 1, and a3 will be assigned to maintain the
baseline calibration assumptions. Hence, the calibration of these parameters for any of the three
models implies that at the (baseline) steady-state rate of inﬂation of 4% per year: 1/3 of the time
is devoted to work, 2% of the time is devoted to shopping, m/c =1 .5, and money satiation occurs
when m/c =3 .0.
The analysis will consist of a case-by-case examination of the diﬀerent steady-state implications
found when altering the rate inﬂation. The rates will start at the Friedman-rule rate (roughly -2%
per year) rising to 10% per year.14 Figures 1-3 and Tables 1-3 display the results for Models 1-3.
The variables reported are: real money balances (m), shopping time (s), the mark-up (ψ), the
real wage (w), average capital (k), average labor (n), consumption (c), leisure (l), average output
(y), and the welfare cost of inﬂation (welfare cost). The welfare cost of inﬂation was calculated
as the percentage of output required to gain suﬃcient utility to render the household indiﬀerent
with respect to the optimal inﬂation case.
Model 1. Fully ﬂexible prices or sticky prices with full price indexation.
This ”capital tax” channel vanishes when prices are either fully ﬂexible to adjust optimally
(η =0 .0) or sticky with all the non-optimal prices following the indexation rule (0.0 < η < 1.0 and
χ =1 .0). In both cases, expression (20) yields ψ = θ
θ−1 and the inﬂation-markup link disappears.
Figure 1 shows this result as the horizontal line in the plot of the real mark-up ψ.W h e ni n ﬂation
changes, there is no change in the tax on capital accumulation coming from the monopolistic
competition setup.
Hence, the only way of explaining departures from superneutrality is through the Friedman-
type channel. The two most important eﬀects of any increase in steady state inﬂation are the
decline in real money balances and the increase in the transaction costs (shopping time) due to
14The Friedman-rule rate of inﬂa t i o ni na n n u a l i z e dp e r c e n t a g et e r m si sπ
∗ =4 0 0∗
−ρ
1+ρ . Inserting the calibrated
ﬁgure ρ =0 .005,w eo b t a i nπ
∗ = −1.99%.
ECB • Working Paper No 140 • May 2002 16the loss of monetary services. Examples shown in Table 1 show that real money falls by 50% when
inﬂation rises from -2% per year to 4% per year and by close to 60% when inﬂation reaches 10%
per year. Shopping time, meanwhile, goes up by 12.9% when annual inﬂation moves up from -2%
to 4% and by nearly 25% when inﬂation reaches10%.
Figure 1. Model 1. Flexible prices or sticky prices with full price indexation.































































Table 1. Model 1. Flexible prices or sticky prices with full price indexation.
Eﬀectsof increasing annual inﬂation in steady state from Friedman rule (-1.99%).
Percent changes in relevant variables Welfare cost
π ms ψ kwn c l y
0% -36.41 4.18 0 -0.25 0 -0.25 -0.25 0.01 -0.25 0.16
4% -50.35 12.92 0 -0.68 0 -0.68 -0.68 0 -0.68 0.50
10% -57.99 24.02 0 -1.20 0 -1.20 -1.20 -0.03 -1.20 0.91
This increase in shopping time s will bring about a fall in average labor n. This fall in labor
will drive capital down as implied by (19). Average output will also fall as a consequence of
the decline in both labor and capital. These are only minor reductions in average labor, average
capital, average output, and consumption (see Figure 1). In fact, they all report the same decrease
in percentage units. Two examples reported in Table 1 show that when annual inﬂation moves
up from the Friedman rule ﬁgure to 4%, all these variables drop by 0.68%, and if steady-state
inﬂation reaches 10% per year, they all fall by 1.20%.
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(0% inﬂation) the welfare cost is 0.16% of output, a 4% annual inﬂation produces a welfare cost
of 0.50% of output, and a 10% inﬂation has a welfare cost equal to 0.91%. The optimal rate of
inﬂation is the Friedman rule rate (-1.99% per year).
Model 2. Sticky prices with partial price indexation.
In Figure 2 and Table 2 we display and report the steady state eﬀects of inﬂa t i o ni nae c o n o m y
with sticky prices (η =0 .75), and partial price indexation. Prices are set optimally only with a
probability equal to 1 − η =0 .25. This means that on average the selling price will be adjusted
optimally only once per year. However, there exists another form of price adjustment through the
indexation rule. We examined the results at three diﬀerent levels of price indexation according to
their probabilities: high (χ =0 .75), medium (χ =0 .50), and low (χ =0 .25).
The strongest impact of increasing inﬂation is observed in real money balances and shopping
time very close to what occurs in the ﬂexible-price economy: there is a signiﬁcant fall in m and a
severe increase in transaction costs s. This result is robust to any price indexation level.
Figure 2. Model 2. Sticky prices with partial price indexation.






























































However the remaining variables show diﬀerent patterns depending on the value of χ.I nt h e
economy with a high level of price indexation (χ =0 .75), the steady-state eﬀects of inﬂation are
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of Figure 2 reveals that the real mark-up, ψ, increases with higher inﬂation. The absence of full
price indexation (0.0 ≤ χ < 1.0) in a sticky-price economy (0.0 < η < 1.0) gives rise to a steady-
state link between inﬂation, π, and the real mark-up, ψ, as shown in (20). Consequently, the capital
tax channel matters in the steady-state analysis of inﬂation. This response is much stronger when
there is little price indexation (χ =0 .25). Put diﬀerently, the capital tax channel is more inﬂuential
with a low level of price indexation, and capital, output and consumption fall very heavily. As
Table 2 reports, when steady-state annual inﬂation moves from -2% to 10%, capital, output and
consumption fall by around 8% in the low-indexed economy (χ =0 .25), whereas they decrease by
less than 2% in the high-indexed economy (χ =0 .75).
Table 2. Model 2. Sticky prices with partial price indexation.
Eﬀectsof increasing annual inﬂation in steady state from Friedman rule (-1.99%).
χ =0 .75
Percent changes in relevant variables Welfare cost
π msψ kwncly
0% -36.42 4.18 -0.02 -0.22 0.03 -0.25 -0.22 0.01 -0.22 0.15
4% -50.41 12.92 0.04 -0.69 -0.06 -0.64 -0.73 -0.02 -0.72 0.56
10% -58.34 23.99 0.54 -1.67 -0.83 -0.84 -1.77 -0.22 -1.75 1.54
χ =0 .50
Percent changes in relevant variables Welfare cost
π msψ kwncly
0% -36.35 4.17 -0.05 -0.18 0.08 -0.27 -0.20 0.03 -0.20 0.12
4% -50.46 12.90 0.15 -0.79 -0.23 -0.56 -0.86 -0.06 -0.84 0.70
10% -59.34 23.95 2.31 -3.22 -3.50 0.29 -3.57 -0.80 -3.47 3.54
χ =0 .25
Percent changes in relevant variables Welfare cost
π msψ kwncly
0% -36.25 4.16 -0.09 -0.15 0.15 -0.30 -0.18 0.04 -0.17 0.08
4% -50.54 12.87 0.37 -0.97 -0.57 -0.40 -1.10 -0.15 -1.06 0.96
10% -62.19 23.80 7.67 -7.66 -10.90 3.64 -8.72 -2.53 -8.43 9.77
It is also interesting to notice that the eﬀect of inﬂation on labor diﬀers in direction depending
on the level of indexation χ. Since the impact on consumption is much stronger with low indexation
we observe a positive response of labor at high rates of inﬂation. Labor supply expands far enough
to outweigh the contraction of labor demand. Thus, the labor market clears with a greater quantity
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noticeable when the economy features little price indexation, χ =0 .25.
Regarding the welfare cost of inﬂation, the two arguments of the utility function, consumption
and leisure, describe larger falls in response to higher inﬂation when the economy exhibits a low
level of price indexation, especially within the high-inﬂation range. In turn, the welfare cost is also
larger (see the welfare cost box in Figure 2). For example, a 10% rate of inﬂation has a welfare
cost equal to 1.54% of output when χ =0 .75 and equal to 9.77% of output when χ =0 .25.
With partial price indexation the optimal rate of inﬂation is no longer at the Friedman rule.
The reason behind this result is that initial increments of inﬂation from the Friedman rule produce
slight falls in the real mark-up. In other words, there exists a u-shape response of the real mark-up
to inﬂation within the negative rates range. This result is reported in Table 2. What we have
there is a negative change in ψ as inﬂation moves from -2% to 0%. This drop is more signiﬁcant
for a lower level of price indexation. A decrease in the capital tax is an incentive for capital
accumulation. Unfortunately we cannot observe this in Figure 2 because the ﬁgures are very
low compared to the positive impact reported at positive rates of inﬂation. The optimal rate of
inﬂation was found to be -1.71% when χ =0 .25, -1.90% when χ =0 .50, and -1.98% when χ =0 .75.
In all three cases the optimal rate is higher than the Friedman rule rate.
Model 3. Sticky prices with no price indexation (Calvo economy).
An economy without the possibility of price indexation is now analyzed. The absence of any
price adjustment when prices cannot be set optimally was the assumption taken in the seminal
paper by Calvo (1983). Thus, we denominate this case as the Calvo economy. Taking η =0 .75
and χ =0 .0, a fraction 1 − η =0 .25 of the prices are set optimally whereas the rest of the prices,
the fraction η =0 .75, remain unchanged.
Figure 3 and Table 3 show that two major eﬀects of higher inﬂation are the fall in real money
balances and the increase in transaction costs as previously observed in both Model 1 and Model
2. Nevertheless, it is also reported that other variables respond to higher inﬂa t i o nm u c hm o r e
aggressively than in the previous models. In particular, capital, output and consumption drop
dramatically when inﬂation rates rise to 10% per year. The origin of these sharp falls is the strong
response of the real mark-up to increasing rates of inﬂation. Some numbers illustrate this result
in Table 3. When inﬂation rises from -2% to 10% in steady state, the real mark-up ψ also rises
by more than 30%. The stock of capital is dramatically aﬀected as it falls by nearly 23%. Output
and consumption also report very severe drops. They both fall by more than 25% when inﬂation
moves from -2% to 10%. Such a wide departure from superneutrality seems very unrealistic.
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price indexation and the rate of inﬂation reaches moderately high ﬁgures, producers become more
aggressive when adjusting the price optimally. They know that they might face a long period
without being able to change the price. Their optimal price is set substantially higher than the
marginal cost. This implies a very high real mark-up. In turn, the capital tax channel exerts a
very harmful eﬀect on capital accumulation. Capital, output, and consumption fall dramatically.
Figure 3. Model 3. Sticky prices with no price indexation (Calvo economy).




























































Table 3. Model 3. Sticky prices with no price indexation (Calvo economy).
Eﬀectsof increasing annual inﬂation in steady state from Friedman rule (-1.99%).
Percent changes in relevant variables Welfare cost
π msψ kwncly
0% -36.14 4.14 -0.14 -0.09 0.22 -0.31 -0.12 0.05 -0.11 0.05
4% -50.75 12.79 0.74 -1.29 -1.15 -0.14 -1.49 -0.28 -1.43 1.42
10% -71.92 22.88 30.65 -22.67 -34.14 17.41 -27.10 -9.59 -25.90 52.61
When inﬂation rises labor reacts in the opposite direction to capital. There is a signiﬁcant
increase in labor when inﬂation approaches 10% per year. This result was already discussed in
Model 2 for the case with low indexation. The Calvo economy can be viewed as the extreme case
with no indexation. The signiﬁcant decrease in consumption shifts the labor supply curve to the
right, i.e., households wish to work more and average labor increases.
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leisure fall in response to higher rates of inﬂation. Annual inﬂation of 4% has a welfare cost equal
to 1.42% of output. There is a very rapid increase in the welfare cost for higher rates. A 10% rate
of inﬂation per year produces a welfare cost of 52.6% of output which means more than one half
of the total output produced per year! This is indeed very unrealistic and would push producers
to use some price indexation scheme as the one featured by Model 2.
Finally, the optimal rate of inﬂation is at -1.32% per year, higher than Friedman rule. As
discussed in Model 2, the initial negative impact on the real mark-up that comes about as a result
of increasing π from the Friedman-rule rate creates positive welfare eﬀects and the optimal rule is
no longer at the Friedman rule.
6 Conclusions
There are two diﬀerent channels of deviation from superneutrality in an optimizing monetary
model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices: the monetary services channel and the
”capital tax” channel. The ﬁrst of these is based on the money demand behavior that leads to less
r e a lm o n e yh e l dw h e ni n ﬂation rises. A decrease in monetary services brings about the need to use
some resources to cover transaction costs. This mechanism corresponds to the classic Friedman
rule analysis of inﬂation. As for the ”capital tax” channel, it can be described by saying that
higher inﬂation aﬀects the mark-up of prices over marginal costs, which acts as a tax on capital
accumulation decisions.
The price setting characteristics of the economy have signiﬁcant inﬂuence in the steady-state
analysis of inﬂation. Hence, the ”capital tax” is only aﬀected by inﬂation if prices are sticky
and at least a fraction of the non-optimal prices are not indexed. Therefore, when prices are
ﬂexible or there are sticky prices with full price indexation, the monetary services channel is the
only mechanism that will account for superneutrality deviations. In turn, any steady-state rise in
inﬂation leads to quantitatively minor reductions in capital, labor, and output. In this case, the
Friedman-rule rate of inﬂation (which leads to a 0% nominal interest rate) becomes the optimal
one on a steady state basis.
By contrast, if prices are sticky and there is not full price indexation, the ”capital tax” channel
becomes the driving force governing the steady-state eﬀects of inﬂation, since its implications
are very inﬂuential on capital, labor, output, and consumption. In addition, the optimal rate of
inﬂation is no longer at the Friedman rule. This paper has shown that the level of price indexation
in the economy becomes crucial in determining the size of the steady-state eﬀects of inﬂation.
Thus, an economy with a low level of price indexation is more severely aﬀected by a rise in the
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For example, if only one fourth of the non-optimal prices are indexed a change in inﬂation from
-2% per year to 10% per year causes output to fall by 8.43%. If three fourths of the non-optimal
prices are being indexed the fall is only by 1.75%.
We also studied the long-run eﬀects of inﬂation in an economy where all the non-optimal prices
remain unchanged, i.e., there is no price indexation at all. This extreme case corresponds to the
original Calvo-type economy. We detected unrealistic features in the steady-state responses of
this model to increases in the rate of inﬂation. Both capital and output reported excessively high
increases, of around 25% when steady-state inﬂation moves from -2% to 10% per year. As a result,
estimates of the welfare cost of inﬂation grow very rapidly with higher inﬂation (they reach a level
of more than 50% of output at a 10% annual rate of inﬂation).
Our results support the primary goal of price stability in the design of a long-run strategy for
monetary policy. Low-inﬂation economies (from the Friedman rule to 4% per year) report low
estimates of the welfare cost of inﬂation. This result is robust to any pricing speciﬁcation.
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• The Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price level PA
t with sticky prices and price indexation.
Both the Calvo-type price stickiness and the possibility of price adjustment imply that the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price level PA
t is
PA
t =[ ( 1 − η)[Pt(0)]
1−θ +( 1− η)ηχ[(1 + π)Pt−1(0)]
1−θ +( 1− η)η(1 − χ)[Pt−1(0)]
1−θ +
(1 − η)η2χ2 (1 + π)2Pt−2(0)
1−θ +2 ( 1− η)η2χ(1 − χ)[(1+π)Pt−2(0)]
1−θ +
(1 − η)η2(1 − χ)2 [Pt−2(0)]
1−θ + ...]1/(1−θ),
where Pt−j(0) is the optimal price in period t−j. The previous expression can be expressed more
brieﬂya s
PA
t = (1 − η)[Pt(0)]




Particular cases worth noting are
η =0 .0 (ﬂexible prices) → PA
t = Pt(0)
η > 0, χ =1 .0 (full indexation) → PA
t = (1 − η)[Pt(0)]
1−θ + η (1 + π)PA
t−1
1−θ 1/(1−θ)
η > 0, χ =0 .0 (Calvo economy) → PA
t = (1 − η)[Pt(0)]
1−θ + η PA
t−1
1−θ 1/(1−θ)
• The steady-state relationship between the optimal price P(0) and the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate
price level PA.
Equation (A1) in steady state implies the following relationship between the price optimally
adjusted in the current period P(0) and the aggregate price level PA
P(0)
PA =




Particular cases worth noting are
η =0 .0 (ﬂexible prices) → P(0) = PA
η > 0, χ =1 .0 (full indexation) → P(0) = PA
η > 0, χ =0 .0 (Calvo economy) → P(0) = PA 1 − η(1 + π)θ−1
1 − η
1/(1−θ)
• The steady-state relationship between average output y and f(n,k).
The Calvo price setting distribution at hand gives rise to the following deﬁnition of average




(1 − η)ηjy(j) , (A3)
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optimally j periods ago. The value of y(j) is expressed in aggregate output units. The amount
produced by each household will be depending on the speciﬁc selling price (that might have been
indexed or not). Taking this into consideration, and the respective Dixit-Stiglitz demand functions










where P−j(0) is the steady-state optimal price set j periods ago. The previous expression is
equivalent to












Since P(0)/PA is constant (see (A2)), the optimal selling price P(0) must grow at the same rate as
the aggregate price level PA. In turn, the steady-state condition that drives the change in optimal
prices for the last j periods is
P(0) = (1 + π)jP−j(0). (A6)
Inserting this result into the price decomposition (A5) and substituting it in equation (A4) yields,
after some algebra,




















(1 − η)ηj (1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ
j P(0)
PA y(0).
By computing the sum over j,w eo b t a i n
y =
1 − η
1 − η[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ]
P(0)
PA y(0),
Now P(0)/PA is substituted by its steady state value obtained in (A2) so as to reach
y =
1 − η
1 − η[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ]
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y =
1 − η
1 − η[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ]
θ/(θ−1)
y(0). (A9)
So far, we have found a steady state relationship between y and y(0). We will now proceed
by deriving the analogous steady state expression relating f(n,k) to y(0) in order to induce a
steady-state relationship between y and f(n,k). The value given by f(n,k) i st h ea m o u n to f
output produced when plugging the steady-state average labor n, and the steady-state average













where nd(j) and k(j) are the steady-state average labor and capital demanded by the fraction of
producers who were last able to set the price optimally j periods ago. Taking the price indexation
probabilities into consideration, the respective Dixit-Stiglitz demand functions for each price set,










(j−k)!k!χj−k(1 − χ)k(1 + π)−θ(j−k) k(j),
(A12)
where nd(j) and k(j) are the steady-state amounts demanded by the fraction of households who
set their price optimally j periods ago and have maintained it unchanged until the current period.
Expression (A12) is equivalent to
nd(j)= 1+( ( 1+π)−θ − 1)χ
j nd(j),
k(j)= 1+( ( 1+π)−θ − 1)χ
j k(j).
(A13)
Now our intention is to write nd(j) and k(j) as a function of nd(0) and k(0), the factor demands
when the price is set optimally for the current period. Since the production technology available
exhibits constant returns to scale there exists a steady-state link between the factor demands at
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nd(j)= (1 − χ)(1 + π)θ + χ
j nd(0),
k(j)= (1 − χ)(1 + π)θ + χ
j k(0).
(A15)
Now by plugging the values obtained in (A15) into (A11)
n =
∞




j=0(1 − η)ηj (1 − χ)(1 + π)θ + χ
j k(0),








The values of n and k implied by (A16) enter the production function (A10)
f(n,k)=
1 − η





w h i c hi nt e r m so fy(0) yields
f(n,k)=
1 − η
1 − η[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ + χ]
y(0). (A17)
The amount of average output y as a function of y(0) was given by equation (A9). Combining








Particular cases worth noting are
η =0 .0 (ﬂexible prices) → y = f(n,k)
η > 0, χ =1 .0 (full indexation) → y = f(n,k)







• The steady state real mark-up ψ.





j=0 βjηj (1 − χ)(1 + π)θ + χ
j ψ−1PAyA
∞
j=0 βjηj [(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ]
j yA , (A19)




1 − βη (1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ
1 − βη[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ + χ]
ψ−1PA. (A20)




1 − βη (1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ








1 − βη (1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ
1 − βη[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ + χ]
1 − η
1 − η[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ]
1/(1−θ)
. (A22)
Particular cases worth noting are
η =0 .0 (ﬂexible prices) → ψ = θ
θ−1
η > 0, χ =1 .0 (full indexation) → ψ = θ
θ−1







• The steady-state solution of the model.





t = nt, the deﬁnitions presented in the
main text. and the results reached above in this appendix, we are able to compute a reduced
steady-state solution of the model by solving the system of equations
π = µ,
r = ρ,
R = r + π(1 + r),
y =
1 − η
1 − η[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ]
θ/(θ−1) 1 − η








1 − βη (1 − χ)(1 + π)θ−1 + χ
1 − βη[(1 − χ)(1 + π)θ + χ]
1 − η






















n = T − l − s,
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m, n, s,a n dl, given some calibrated value for the parameters ρ, σ, Υ, γ, a0, a1, a2, a3, δ, α, θ,
η, χ,a n dµ.
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